Subordinate financialization in emerging capitalist economies by Bonizzi, Bruno et al.
1		
Subordinate Financialization in Emerging 
Capitalist Economies 
 
Bruno Bonizzi, University of Hertfordshire;  
Annina Kaltenbrunner, Leeds University Business School; and 
Jeff Powell, University of Greenwich 
 
Abstract 
 
In the explosion of literature on financialization, there is a much smaller but growing interest in 
what the phenomenon means for emerging capitalist economies (ECEs).  We hold that for 
agents located in ECEs, the encounter with financialization is from a subordinate position: first, 
in relation to global production, ECE firms occupy subordinate locations in global production 
networks, providing cheap labor and raw, or at best, intermediate inputs; Second, in relation to 
global finance, ECEs are structurally subordinated to ACEs, that is, both trade and the most 
liquid capital markets are denominated in the currency of ACEs.  Subordination in production 
means firms based in ECEs are able to capture less of the value created than firms higher in 
the hierarchy and must pay more to hedge macroeconomic risk.  In circulation, strategies may 
emerge in ACEs wherein increased household indebtedness and/or asset market inflation 
maintain aggregate demand.  In finance, ECEs’ subordinate position in relation to money and 
capital markets means that capital inflows are predominantly short-term, seeking financial 
yields rather than assuming productive risk. The results are continued volatility, external 
vulnerability and subordination to the currencies of the ACEs, which themselves serve to further 
deepen domestic financialization.  We conclude that, while by no means pre-destined, 
financialization as experienced in ECEs may serve to further cement their subordinate position 
in the global structure. 
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1.	 Introduction			In	the	explosion	of	literature	on	financialization,	there	is	a	much	smaller	but	growing	interest	in	what	the	phenomenon	means	for	emerging	capitalist	economies	(ECEs)	(Bonizzi,	2013).	Much	of	the	 literature	that	 focuses	on	the	advanced	capitalist	economies	(ACEs)	 lacks	a	clear	 theory	of	financialization.	This	absence	becomes	even	more	problematic	when	the	lens	is	used	to	attempt	to	describe	and	understand	changes	in	ECEs.				The	 theory	 of	 financialization	 adopted	 here	 draws	 a	 necessary	 distinction	 between	 processes	which	 are	 cyclical	 in	 nature,	 and	 secular	 changes	 in	 the	 relations	 of	 capitalist	 accumulation	(Powell,	2018).	The	former	are	both	temporally	and	spatially	limited,	with	financialization	giving	way	to	de-financialization.	The	latter	mark	the	emergence	of	a	new	stage	of	mature	capitalism	-	financialized	capitalism	-	wherein	the	passage	of	capital	 through	its	various	 forms	–	 in	Marxist	terms,	 from	 money	 capital	 to	 productive	 capital	 to	 commodity	 capital,	 and	 back	 again	 –	 is	occurring	 at	 the	 global	 level,	 rather	 than	within	 the	 nation-state.	 	 The	 last	 two	 decades	 have	witnessed	 the	 realization	 of	 this	 process,	 first	 theorized	 in	 the	 1970s	 with	 the	 rise	 of	 the	multinational	corporation	(Palloix,	1975).	Whereas	this	internationalization	had	previously	been	limited	to	financing	and	commodity	circulation,	it	now	includes	the	genuine	internationalization	of	production	 itself.	 	Within	this	 transformation,	 finance	plays	a	catalytic	role	 in	 the	extension,	expansion	 and	 intensification	 of	 capitalist	 accumulation;	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 it	 is	 afforded	unprecedented	opportunities	for	exploitation	and	expropriation,	both	legal	and	otherwise.			Theorizing	financialized	capitalism	as	a	global	phenomenon	in	this	way,	requires	us	to	confront	how	it	emerges	from	and	plays	out	across	a	hierarchical	and	uneven	global	landscape.	We	hold	that	for	agents	located	in	ECEs,	the	encounter	with	both	cyclical	processes	and	secular	stage,	is	from	a	subordinate	position.	This	subordination	is	approached	from	two	analytical	vantage	points.	First,	in	relation	to	global	production,	ECE	firms	generally	occupy	subordinate	locations	in	global	production	 networks,	 providing	 cheap	 labor	 and	 raw,	 or	 at	 best,	 intermediate	 inputs.	 This	structural	 subordination	 in	global	production,	among	other	 things,	mediates	ECEs’	relations	 to	financial	markets,	both	as	potential	 contenders	 for	 lead	 firm	position,	 and	power	and	position	within	the	network	itself.			Second,	in	relation	to	global	finance,	ECEs	are	structurally	subordinated	to	ACEs,	that	is,	both	trade	and	 the	most	 liquid	 capital	markets	are	denominated	 in	 the	 currency	of	ACEs.	The	hegemonic	position	of	 the	 capital	markets	of	 the	ACEs,	 especially	 the	United	States,	 is	bound	up	with	 the	dominant	role	of	their	currencies	(Kaltenbrunner	and	Lysandrou,	2017).	ECE	currencies,	on	the	other	hand,	sit	on	the	lower	end	of	the	hierarchy,	a	fact	that	fundamentally	shapes	their	interaction	with	financial	markets	(Powell,	2013;	Prates	and	Andrade,	2013;	Kaltenbrunner,	2015;	Bonizzi,	2017a).				In	what	 follows,	we	attempt	to	advance	our	understanding	of	how	subordinate	 financialization	emerges	 from	 and	 plays	 out	 in	 the	 realms	 of	 production,	 circulation	 and	 finance	 in	 ECEs.	 In	production,	 lead	 firms	 within	 cyclical	 limits	 may	 be	 able	 to	 capture	 profits	 across	 global	production	networks	which	 can	be	used	 to	pay	dividends,	buyback	 shares,	boost	management	salaries	or	purchase	financial	assets,	with	possibly	deleterious	effects	for	fixed	investment.	Even	where	 such	 financial	 artistry	 meets	 its	 limits,	 globalized	 firms	 must	 continue	 with	 their	engagement	with	financial	products	which	help	them	manage	increasingly	complex	networks	of	uncertainty.	Their	subordination	in	international	production	means	firms	based	in	ECEs	are	able	to	capture	less	of	the	value	created	than	firms	higher	in	the	hierarchy	and	must	pay	more	to	hedge	macroeconomic	risk.	Their	subordinate	location	in	relation	to	markets	and	currencies	means	their	
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rising	engagement	with	 financial	markets,	either	as	a	result	of	 their	 lead	 firm	position	or	 in	an	attempt	to	strengthen	their	position	in	the	network,	take	on	potentially	different	forms	than	those	observed	in	ACEs	(e.g.	the	relative	importance	of	foreign	currency	debt).	These	forms	bring	with	it	increased	volatility,	external	vulnerability	and	financial	instability.			In	circulation,	strategies	may	emerge	in	ACEs	wherein	increased	household	indebtedness	and/or	asset	market	 inflation	maintain	aggregate	demand.	Lower	 levels	of	 income	and	wealth	 in	ECEs	may	circumscribe	such	a	model,	encouraging	the	turn	to	export-led	growth,	a	pattern	consistent	with	their	subordinate	position	within	global	production	networks.	This,	in	turn,	encourages	the	development	of	domestic	financial	markets	and	may	put	downward	pressure	on	wages,	benefits	and	 taxes	 which	 underpin	 systems	 of	 social	 reproduction	 (e.g.	 health,	 education	 and	unemployment	insurance),	encouraging	a	turn	towards	private	welfare	provision.			Finally,	ECEs’	subordinate	position	in	relation	to	money	and	capital	markets	means	that	capital	inflows	are	predominantly	short-term,	seeking	financial	yields	rather	than	assuming	productive	risk.	 The	 results	 are	 continued	 volatility,	 external	 vulnerability	 and	 subordination	 to	 the	currencies	of	the	ACEs,	which	themselves	serve	to	further	deepen	domestic	financialization.		By	highlighting	 the	 potentially	 negative	 implications,	 we	 conclude	 that,	 while	 by	 no	 means	 pre-destined,	financialization	as	experienced	in	ECEs	may	serve	to	further	cement	their	subordinate	position	in	the	global	structure.					
2.	 Internationalization	of	Production			The	 first	 transformation	 of	 global	 capital	 accumulation	 considered	 crucial	 to	 conceptualize	financialization	phenomena	in	ECEs	is	the	internationalization	of	production,	that	is	the	creation	of	global	networks	of	production,	transforming	value	creation	and	labor	relations.	As	the	literature	on	Global	Value	Chains	(GVCs)	and	Global	Production	Networks	(GPNs)	shows,	large	firms,	more	often	than	not	originating	from	the	capitalist	core,	have	disaggregated	production	processes	and	distributed	them	over	the	globe	ranging	from	loose	relationships	such	as	competitive	customer-supplier	relations	to	tight	intra-firm	relations	(Gereffi	et	al.,	2005).	Although	specifics	depend	on	the	 actual	 configuration	 of	 the	 network,	 common	 to	 these	 geographically	 disaggregated	production	 processes	 is	 the	 existence	 of	 uneven	 power	 relations	 and	 extraction	 of	 value	 from	weaker	parts	of	the	chain	which	frequently	concentrate	on	lower	wage	production	(Bair,	2005).	These	 are	 often	 located	 in	 the	 Global	 South	 but	 also	 in	 ACE	 countries	 such	 as	 Spain,	 Italy	 or	Portugal.	While	 the	actual	 generation	of	value	 is	 increasingly	dispersed	geographically,	profits	continue	to	be	captured	in	the	capitalist	core.			So	far,	the	discussion	of	how	this	international	reorganization	of	production	shapes,	and	is	in	itself	shaped	by	financialization	has	been	rather	limited	(Powell,2018).	In	their	seminal	work,	Milberg	and	Winkler	(2008,	2010)	argue	that	US	firms	have	generated	higher	profits	due	to	the	mark-ups	generated	 from	 their	 powerful	 positions	 in	GVCs/GPNs,	 towards	 both	 suppliers	 and	workers,	which	has	allowed	them	to	sustain	 financialization	processes	through	freeing	up	resources	 for	financial	investments.	Baud	and	Durand	(2012)	add	to	this	by	highlighting	the	ability	of	lead	firms	to	 free	cash	and	reduce	 financing	costs	by	transferring	the	need	to	hold	 inventories	onto	their	suppliers	 and	 extend	 supplier	 payment	 periods.	 Rather	 than	 reinvesting	 these	 profits	 in	 core	activities,	they	were	used	to	pay	higher	dividends,	buy	back	shares	to	drive	up	stock	prices,	and	pursue	mergers	 and	 acquisitions.	 This	 argument	 is	 confirmed	 econometrically	 by	Durand	 and	Gueuder	(2016)	and	Auvray	and	Rabinovich	(2017)	who	show	that	US	firms’	offshoring	decisions	were	related	to	the	slowdown	in	gross	fixed	capital	formation.		
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These	changes	in	international	production	also	have	significant	effects	on	ECE	firms.	On	the	one	hand,	although	still	 limited,	a	few	ECE	firms	(e.g.	Tata	from	India	or	Embraer	from	Brazil)	have	turned	themselves	into	global	players	and	lead	firms	of	global	and	regional	production	networks	(Mathews,	2006;	Unctad,	2007).	In	line	with	the	argument	above,	the	resulting	pooling	of	profits	in	 the	head	offices	of	 these	 firms	has	generated	 resources	 (Toporowski	2009)	which	 could	be	diverted	 into	 financial	markets.	More	generally,	 their	 internationalization	requires,	and	 indeed	enables,	 Non-Financial	 Corporations	 (NFCs)	 to	 operate	 in	 different	 financial	 markets	 and	currencies	to	obtain	funding,	hedge	currency	and	operational	risks,	and	invest	in	financial	assets.	These	 new	 risks	 and	 opportunities	 require	 increased	 financial	 sophistication	 and	 tie	 NFCs’	operations	to	(international)	financial	markets.			On	 the	 other	 hand,	 financialization	 	 can	 become	 a	 crucial	 factor	 in	 determining	 a	 firm’s	‘competitiveness’	both	between	lead	firms	and	within	the	network	itself	(Graser,	2010;	Hiratuka	and	 da	 Rocha,	 2015).	 	 For	 example,	 if	 global	 leadership	 is	 achieved	 through	 mergers	 and	acquisitions	 both	 the	 cost	 of	 external	 financing	 and	 large	 cash	holdings	 are	 important	 to	 take	advantage	of	opportunities	and/or	fend	off	hostile	takeovers.	This	is	more	likely	in	the	case	of	ECE	firms	which	do	not	start	from	a	dominant	position.	Moreover,	Randøy	et	al.	(2001:	667)	argue	that	“the	global	wave	of	mergers	and	acquisitions	makes	 it	 important	 for	companies	to	boost	stock	price	in	order	to	maintain	influence	after	a	potential	merger	and	protect	themselves	from	being	taken	over”.			At	the	same	time,	internationalization	becomes	part	and	parcel	of	a	more	financially-oriented	firm	strategy.	 Hiratuka	 and	 Sarti	 (2011)	 and	 Carmody	 (2002)	 show	 for	 Brazil	 and	 South	 Africa	respectively	that	in	several	cases	the	internationalization	of	domestic	firms	were	aimed	explicitly	at	becoming	global	players	to	boost	their	shareholder	value	and	ability	to	leverage.	This	echoes	results	by	Palpacuer	et	al.	(2006)	who	show	for	large	French	agribusinesses	that	once	exposed	to	international	 financial	 markets,	 further	 internationalization	 became	 an	 important	 element	 of	“financial	success”.	According	to	their	results,	 large	 international	(institutional)	 investors	want	global	players	which	can	diversify	their	assets	and	income	streams	and	are	powerful	actors	in	the	market.	Similarly,	Montalban	and	Sakinç	(2013)	argue	that	externalization	and	outsourcing	are	important	 consequences	 of	 shareholder	 value	 orientation,	 as	 these	 practices	 can	 decrease	 the	level	of	capital	used	and	increase	returns	on	assets.			Whereas	these	processes	are	likely	to	be	found	in	ACEs,	we	contend	that	in	the	case	of	ECEs	they	will	be	mediated	through	their	subordinate	position	in	financial	and	product	markets	(Painceira,	2011;	Powell,	2013;	Kaltenbrunner	and	Painceira	2016).	As	to	financial	markets,	whereas	ACEs’	firms	can	largely	fund	themselves	in	domestic	financial	markets	and	currencies,	recent	surges	of	ECEs’	NFCs	borrowing	have	been	predominantly	in	foreign	currency	and	on	international	financial	markets	 (Bruno	 and	 Shin	 2015,	 McCauley,	 McGuire	 et	 al.	 2015).	 This	 not	 only	 deepens	 their	vulnerability	 to	 exchange	 rate	 changes	 but	 also	 ties	 them	 further	 to	 financial	 markets	 when	attempting	to	hedge	the	resulting	risk.	As	a	result,	several	ECEs,	such	as	Brazil,	Mexico	and	Poland,	have	 seen	a	 substantial	 increase	 in	domestic	derivatives	markets	 (Farhi	 and	Borghi,	2009).	 In	several	 cases,	 such	 as	 the	 cellulose	 producer	Aracruz	 in	Brazil	 or	 the	 tortilla	maker	Gruma	 in	Mexico,	these	operations	also	turned	speculative	and	led	to	substantial	losses	in	the	international	financial	crisis	of	2008.		At	the	same	time,	the	predominance	of	debt	issues	on	international	financial	markets	(offshore),	combined	 with	 a	 generally	 larger	 share	 of	 foreign	 investors	 in	 domestic	 debt	 markets,	 has	deepened	 their	 vulnerability	 to	 international	 market	 conditions	 and	 required	 a	 more	sophisticated	management	of	the	resulting	risks.	One	distinct	element	of	ECE	firm	financialization	
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has	been	the	substantial	increase	in	cash	holdings	(Karwowski,	2012;	Powell,2013;)	which	were,	at	 least	 partly,	 precautionary	 (Demir	 2009,	 Akkemik	 and	 Özen	 2014).	 One	 could	 argue	 that	international	 investors	 are	more	 forceful	 in	 putting	 shareholder	 value	 pressures	 on	 domestic	NFCs.	These	global	operators	with	vast	international	portfolios	can	easily	adjust	their	positions.	This	gives	these	institutions	a	higher	possibility	of	“exit”	hence	putting	pressure	on	domestic	NFCs.	Offshore	issuance	also	means	that	the	debt	is	issued	under	the	law	of	the	country	of	arbitration	which	reduces	the	 influence	of	national	legal	systems	and	more	generally	 the	reach	of	 the	ECE	state.	 Arguably,	 the	 terms	 of	 these	 debt	 contracts	will	 be	 designed	 by	 the	 large	 international	financial	institutions	intermediating	and	marketing	the	debt,	which	potentially	endows	them	with	an	informational	and	operational	advantage	(e.g.	with	regards	to	their	underlying	risks).			Finally,	there	is	some	evidence	that	ECE	firms’	internationalization	and	increased	financialization	has	interacted	with	the	financialization	of	other	sectors,	although	experiences	vary	from	country	to	country	and	more	research	is	needed.	For	example,	the	increased	financial	needs	of	ECEs	have	required	 increased	 financial	 sophistication	 from	 domestic	 banking	 systems	 and/or	 fostered	foreign	bank	entry	to	 fill	 the	void.	Reflecting	another	element	of	ECEs’	 financial	subordination,	foreign	banks	tend	to	have	better	access	to	 international	 financial	markets	and	experience	and	information	on	offshore	markets	which	gives	them	an	advantage	over	domestic	banks	(Pelletier	2018).			
3.	 Internationalization	of	Circulation	and	Profit	Realization		As	production	becomes	internationalized,	new	issues	emerge	in	the	phase	of	profit	realization.	In	the	present	conditions	of	increasing	concentration	and	intensive	exploitation	of	global	productive	networks,	companies	are	capable	of	holding	down	labor	costs;	low	wages	in	turn	create	the	issue	of	ensuring	adequate	effective	demand	to	allow	profit	realization	and	the	continuation	of	capital	accumulation.	Financialization	has	in	this	sense	been	understood	as	a	way	to	ease	the	problem	of	low	demand	and	thus	counter	the	potential	stagnation	tendencies	of	global	capitalism	(Harvey	2011;	Magdoff	and	Sweezy	1987).	This	line	of	thought	also	finds	echoes	in	the	Post	Keynesian	and	‘regulationist’	 literature	 that	 focuses	 on	 a	 “finance-dominated”	 accumulation	 regime	 where	financial	dynamics	affect	aggregate	demand	(Boyer	2000;	Hein	2012).	.		In	 this	 line	 of	 thought,	 financialization	 can	 stimulate	 aggregate	 demand	 through	 two	 main	channels:	 asset	 price	 inflation	 and	 increasing	 indebtedness.	 Rising	 asset	 prices	 –	 especially	housing	–	and	increasing	credit	to	households	have	been	crucial	to	stimulate	demand	and	sustain	accumulation,	 through	 a	 combination	 of	 reduced	 saving	 and	 wealth	 effects	 on	 consumption	(Crouch	2009;	Cynamon	and	Fazzari	2008).	At	 the	global	 level,	 the	 location	of	production	and	realization	of	profits	through	these	mechanisms	do	not	have	to	coincide:	surplus	value	extracted	in	one	country	may	well	be	exported	and	realized	as	profit	in	another,	where	asset	price	inflation	and	 indebtedness	 fuel	 demand.	 In	 an	 internationalized	 and	 financialized	 world	 economy,	 the	mechanism	 that	 sustains	 aggregate	 demand	 and	 profit	 realization	 in	 individual	 countries	 can	therefore	be	either	(net)	exports	or	debt-fueled	consumption.		Financialization	in	ECEs	needs	to	be	understood	in	relation	to	these	global	patterns	of	circulation	and	profit	realization.	Many	ECEs	have	relied	on	an	export-oriented	growth	strategy,	often	as	an	explicit	policy	goal	that	came	as	part	of	Washington	Consensus	policies.	Such	a	strategy	however	is	not	purely	a	matter	of	policy	choice	but	reflects	the	restructuring	of	global	production	described	in	the	previous	section:	in	general,	ECEs	occupy	a	structurally	subordinate	position	within	GPNs,	favouring	a	role	as	producer	of	primary	commodities,	intermediate	goods,	and	consumer	goods	
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for	export.	ACEs,	and	chiefly	the	United	States,	have	played	the	counterpart	role	of	the	importers,	as	“debt-financed	excess	spending	from	the	capital	gains	of	a	housing	boom	turned	Americans	into	the	world’s	 buyers	 of	 the	 last	 resort	 absorbing	 the	 export-led	 growth	 of	 Europe	 and	 of	many	emerging	market	economies”	(Guttmann,	2016:	140).			Export-led	growth	shapes	the	process	of	financialization	in	ECEs	in	particular	ways.	At	first	glance,	there	is	evidence	that	this	growth	model	reduces	the	scope	for	many	financialized	practices	that	are	typically	associated	with	debt-led	economies.	 In	most	countries	where	exports	are	the	key	lever	of	aggregate	demand,	there	is	evidence	that	countries	experience	lower	levels	of	household	indebtedness	 and	 less	 pronounced	 real	 estate	 booms	 (Karwowski	 and	 Stockhammer,	 2017;	Mertens,	2017).	Nevertheless,	as	discussed,	financialization	seen	as	a	global	secular	phenomenon	goes	 deeper	 than	 its	 cyclical	 quantitative	 manifestations.	 Its	 structural	 secular	 dimensions	manifest	in	ECEs	in	a	way	that	is	mediated	by	their	export-led	structure.		First,	the	proceeds	from	exports	can	be	channeled	towards	domestic	and	international	financial	markets.	 As	 exporters	 in	 ECEs	 realize	 profits,	 subdued	 domestic	 demand	 may	 limit	 the	opportunities	 for	 profitable	 investment.	 Just	 like	 in	 advanced	 economies,	 NFCs	 and	 wealthy	individuals	may	 then	 be	 led	 to	 invest	 in	 financial	markets.	 There	 is	 evidence	 that	 NFCs	 have	accumulated	a	growing	share	of	assets	 in	 financial	 investments,	often	at	 the	detriment	of	 fixed	capital	 formation	 (Correa	 et	 al.,2012;	 Demir,2007;	 Karwowski,2015;	 Seo	 et	 al.,2012;	 Tori	 and	Onaran,2017).	Furthermore,	inequalities	in	the	distribution	of	wealth	and	income	fueled	financial	asset	demand,	as	large	profits	were	distributed	in	the	hands	of	high-net	worth	individuals,	fueling	stock	market	booms	in	several	ECEs	(Akyüz	2017).	A	form	of	“elite	financialization”	developed	in	those	countries	where	domestic	financial	rates	of	returns	–	e.g.	high	interest	rates	to	attract	capital	inflows	–	made	it	possible	for	wealthier	sections	of	the	population	to	find	remunerative	savings	vehicles	(Araújo	et	al.,	2012;	Becker	et	al.,	2010).	Nevertheless,	given	the	small	capacity	of	ECEs’	financial	markets	as	well	as	their	subordination	in	the	global	financial	system,	a	large	share	of	this	wealth	has	been	invested	into	ACEs	(Goda	et	al.,	2017;	Lysandrou,	2011).		Second,	 export-led	 growth	 has	 contributed	 to	 the	 accumulation	 of	 foreign	 exchange	 reserves,	where	central	banks	have	intervened	in	the	foreign	exchange	markets.	In	those	countries	which	experienced	current	account	surpluses	–	by	accident	or	 ‘neo-mercantilist’	design	–	net	exports	directly	fuelled	the	accumulation	of	reserves	(Painceira	2009).	But	even	in	those	‘unsuccessful’	export-led	 ECEs,	 which	 did	 not	 produce	 substantial	 current	 account	 surpluses,	 reserves	accumulation	proceeded	on	the	back	of	substantial	foreign	capital	inflows	(Levy-Orlik	2014;	Luna	2015).	 Accumulation	 of	 reserves	 paradoxically	 represents	 both	 a	 reaction	 to	 financialization	dictated	by	export	orientation,	and	its	strengthening:	they	allow	ECEs	to	act	in	foreign	exchange	markets,	and	thus	contain	exchange	rate	volatility,	which	can	have	severe	destabilizing	effects	on	exports;	but	they	simultaneously	represent	wealth	that	is	channeled	to	financial	markets,	through	vehicles	such	as	Sovereign	Wealth	Funds,	in	a	way	not	dissimilar	to	the	portfolio	of	wealthy	private	investors	(Monk,	2011).	As	discussed	further	below,	these	reserves	have	also	been	instrumental	in	driving	the	development	of	domestic	financial	markets	(Lapavitsas	2014;	Painceira	2012).			Third,	financialization	may	provide	ways	to	support	export	orientation	through	its	engagement	with	 households.	 Reforms	 of	 social	 security	 systems,	 involving	 greater	 reliance	 on	 financial	markets,	have	been	part	of	 the	restructuring	of	 the	economy	towards	export-led	growth,	often	coming	as	a	part	of	neoliberal	“policy	packages”	(Becker	et	al.,	2010;	Correa	et	al.,	2012;	Cosar	and	Yegenoglu,	2009;	Lavinas,	2017).	Finance	has	therefore	served	as	an	engine	to	establish	privatized	forms	of	social	reproduction,	as	the	competitive	pressures	of	export	orientation	and	the	need	to	keep	a	country’s	position	within	GPNs	 limit	 the	scope	 for	public	provision	of	welfare.	Through	
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these	reforms	households	in	ECEs	have	come	to	depend	to	a	greater	extent	on	financial	markets,	through	the	expansion	of	private	pension	funds,	pooled	investment	systems,	and	easier	access	to	credit	 including	 for	 housing	 purchases	 (Correa	 et	 al.	 2012;	 Rethel	 2010).	 Furthermore,	 credit	extension	 can	 also	work	 as	 a	 disciplining	mechanism,	 undermining	 the	 resistance	 of	 indebted	workers	(Karacimen,	2015;	Mader,	2015).			While	 export	 orientation	 represents	 a	 key	 tendency	 in	 the	majority	 of	 ECEs,	 there	 have	 been	exceptions.	For	example,	there	is	evidence	that	in	some	ECEs	forms	of	debt-financed	consumption	have	taken	place:	household	debt	expansion	has	at	least	partly	contributed	to	stimulate	aggregate	demand	in	South	Africa	(Newman,	2014),	Brazil	(Lavinas,	2017),	Slovakia	(Becker	et	al.,	2010)	and	Malaysia	(Rethel,	2010).	Finance	has	therefore	worked	as	a	‘relief	valve’	for	domestic	aggregate	demand	even	in	ECEs,	at	least	temporarily.	It	is	not	surprising	therefore	that	indebtedness	in	ECEs	has	increased	in	the	post-crisis	period,	as	the	US	tempered	its	role	as	global	‘buyer	of	last	resort’,	thus	limiting	the	potential	of	export-led	growth.			In	 sum,	 financialization	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 an	 aid	 to	 circulation	 and	 profit	 realization	 by	stimulating	aggregate	demand	globally.	In	this,	ECEs	have	mainly	–	though	not	exclusively	–	played	a	role	of	exporters	to	debt-led	economies,	chiefly	the	US	as	the	‘buyer	of	last	resort’.	The	forms	of	financialization	in	ECEs	are	therefore	fundamentally	shaped	by	this	phenomenon,	as	corporations	and	 central	 banks	 accumulate	wealth	 that	 is	 channeled	 towards	 financial	 assets,	 fostering	 the	development	 of	 financial	 markets	 and	 financial	 innovation	 domestically,	 and	 households	increasingly	 engage	 with	 financial	 markets	 to	 manage	 those	 activities	 necessary	 to	 social	reproduction.	The	 precise	 forms	 taken	 vary	 according	 to	 each	 nation’s	particular	 involvement	with	these	structural	features.				
4.	 Internationalization	of	Finance			The	final	change	in	global	capital	accumulation	we	want	to	highlight	is	the	tremendous	increase	in	 international	 financial	 markets,	 their	 changing	 nature,	 and	 ECEs’	 shifting	 and	 subordinate	integration	into	them.	.	Moreover,	ECEs’	integration	into	these	global	markets	has	also	changed,	in	a	 process	 which	 could	 be	 considered	 the	 international	 aspect	 of	 financialization	 (Bortz	 and	Kaltenbrunner,	2017).			First,	in	line	with	the	expansion	of	global	finance,	ECEs’	external	assets	and	liabilities	rose	from	under	33%	to	more	than	130%	of	their	GDP	between	1970	and	2013.	Capital	inflows	and	outflows	rose	from	3.52	per	cent	and	2.22	per	cent	of	GDP	in	1976–85	to	more	than	6	per	cent	and	nearly	8	per	cent	respectively	in	2006–15	(Bortz	and	Kaltenbrunner,	2017).			Second,	the	nature	of	these	flows	has	changed	and	has	become	highly	complex	characterized	by	new	instruments,	markets	and	international	actors.	As	to	the	actors,	traditional	investors	in	ECEs	(such	as	banks	and	dedicated	funds)	have	been	joined	by	a	wide	range	of	other	actors,	including	institutional	investors	(pension,	mutual	and	insurance	funds)	(Bonizzi,	2017b)	and	new	types	of	mutual	fund	investors	such	as	exchange-traded	funds	and	macro	hedge	funds	(Aron	et	al.,	2010;	Jones,	 2012;	 Yuk,	 2012).	 Given	 the	 enormous	 size	 of	 these	 financial	 investors,	 even	 a	 small	reallocation	of	their	portfolio	can	have	a	substantial	impact	on	capital	flows	to	ECEs.	Moreover,	these	 different	 actors	 have	 diverse	 investment	 strategies	 and	 funding	 patterns,	 substantially	increasing	the	complexity	of	 foreign	 investment.	With	regards	to	the	 instruments	and	markets,	foreign	investors	have	gained	access	to	a	wider	set	of	(domestic	currency)	assets,	such	as	equities,	derivatives,	 and	 local	 bond	 markets	 (Kaltenbrunner	 and	 Painceira,	 2015,	 Akyüz,	 2017).	
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Kaltenbrunner	and	Painceira	 (2015)	argue	 that	 the	 returns	of	 these	assets	are	often	based	on	capital	gains,	rather	than	investment	income,	which	potentially	increases	the	volatility	of	capital	flows	and	increases	the	importance	of	open	and	liquid	financial	markets	for	portfolio	adjustment.	In	the	case	of	domestic	currency	assets,	the	exchange	rate	becomes	an	important	element	of	these	capital	gains,	resulting	 in	destabilizing	 feedback	dynamics	not	only	 in	asset	prices	but	also	the	exchange	rate.			Third,	 the	 relation	 between	 domestic	 actors	 and	 international	 financial	markets	 has	 tightened	considerably.	As	discussed	above,	NFCs	from	ECEs	have	become	active	players	on	international	financial	 markets	 and	 internationalized	 their	 balance	 sheets.	 ECEs’	 banks	 have	 expanded	internationally,	 partly	 accompanying	 the	 increase	 in	 outward	 FDI,	 partly	 offering	 their	 rich	domestic	clients	new	investment	opportunities	abroad,	and	partly	on	their	own	account	(World	Economic	Forum,	2012).	In	many	ECEs	household	lending	has	surged,	in	several	of	them	largely	denominated	in	foreign	currency	(Gabor,	2010).			In	line	with	the	broader	argument,	these	changes	in	ECEs’	financial	integration	were	shaped	by	their	subordinate	position	in	the	international	financial	and	monetary	system	which	manifested	itself	both	in	the	nature	of	their	international	financialization	and	its	implications.	As	to	the	former,	although	ECE	public	actors	could	borrow	increasingly	in	domestic	currency	(less	so	private	ones	which	had	to	rely	largely	on	international	dollar	funding	as	discussed	above)	and	seemingly	move	away	from	their	traditional	‘original	sin’,	foreign	financial	flows	to	those	countries	have	remained	relatively	volatile.	They	have	been	dominated	by	short-term	financial	return	considerations	rather	than	productive,	 long-term	 investment.	One	example	are	 the	notorious	 carry	 trade	operations,	where	financial	actors	borrow	in	low	interest	rate	currencies,	such	as	the	Japanese	Yen	or	the	US	Dollar,	and	invest	in	high-interest	ECE	currencies,	taking	advantage	of	the	interest	rate	differential	and	very	often	sustained	periods	of	exchange	rate	appreciation	caused	by	those	same	carry	trade	operations.	These	high	 interest	 rates	and	profitable	exchange	 rate	movements,	 in	 turn,	 are	 an	expression	 of	 ECEs’	 international	monetary	 subordination	 necessary	 to	 compensate	 for	 these	currencies’	lower	standing	in	the	international	currency	hierarchy.			Even	long-term	investors	and	those	invested	in	domestic	assets	remain	funded	on	international	financial	 markets	 which	 maintains	 their	 sensitivity	 to	 international	 market	 conditions	 and	depreciation	 pressures	 on	 ECEs’	 assets	 and	 currencies	 as	 funds	 need	 to	 be	 repatriated	 in	 the	future.	For	example,	Bonizzi	(2017b)	shows	that	despite	their	longer	time	horizons	pension	fund	investment	in	ECEs	will	not	act	as	a	stabilizing	force	due	to	their	need	to	match	their	liabilities,	which	 are	 predominantly	 located	 in	 the	 capitalist	 core.	 Finally,	 probably	 one	 of	 the	 clearest	manifestations	of	ECEs	subordinated	position	in	international	finance	has	been	the	phenomenon	of	reserve	accumulation.	As	mentioned	in	the	previous	section,	rather	than	being	channeled	into	the	economy,	billions	of	dollars	have	been	absorbed	by	ECE	central	banks	to	protect	against	future	capital	outflows	 (and	 frequently	 to	deal	with	 the	exchange	 rate	volatility	associated	with	both	capital	in-	and	outflows).			Though	 still	 quite	 limited,	 several	 authors	 have	 shown	 how	 these	 aspects	 of	 ECEs’	 financial	integration	 have	 shaped	 domestic	 financialization	 processes.	 For	 example,	 volatile	 capital	 and	exchange	rate	movements	tighten	economic	actors’,	 in	particular	NFCs’,	relations	to	derivatives	and	financial	markets	more	generally	(Coutinho	and	Belluzzo,	1998,	Correa	et	al.	2012;	Akkemik	and	Özen,	2014).	Painceira	(2011)	shows	convincingly,	in	the	case	of	Brazil	and	South	Korea,	how	reserve	accumulation	and	consequent	sterilization	operations	(the	sale	of	short-term	government	bonds	 by	 the	 central	 bank	 to	 absorb	 the	 additional	money	 created	 from	 its	 foreign	 exchange	purchases)	 contributed	 to	 the	 financialization	 of	 banks	 (reflected	 in	 an	 expansion	 of	 balance	
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sheets	and	increase	in	market	funding)	and	households	(through	consumption	loans).	According	to	his	argument,	domestic	banks	used	the	sterilization	bonds	issued	by	the	central	banks	to	(a)	increase	 their	 own	 short-term	 funding	 and	 (b)	 use	 this	 short-term	 funding	 to	 increase	 their	lending	to	households.			In	sum,	in	addition	to	changes	in	the	international	organization	and	realization	of	production,	the	changing	nature	of	international	financial	markets	themselves	have	contributed	fundamentally	to	financialisation	processes	 in	ECEs.	On	the	one	hand	this	refers	 to	 the	growing	but	subordinate	nature	of	ECE	financial	integration,	which	is	dominated	by	short-term	capital	flows	that	remain	funded	 in	 ACE	 currencies.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 such	 integration	 has	 fundamentally	 shaped	 the	financial	practices	of	domestic	 agents,	 such	as	 the	holding	of	 financial	 assets	by	NFCs	and	 the	expansion	of	bank	loans	for	consumption.				
5.	 Conclusions			It	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 ECEs’	 financialization	 emerges	 and	 is	 fundamentally	 shaped	 by	 the	subordinate	nature	of	their	integration	into	the	world	economy.	We	have	examined	how	this	has	played	out	across	production,	circulation	and	finance.	In	production,	the	global	disaggregation	of	production	networks,	and	ECE	firms’	emerging	leadership	and/or	integration	into	these	networks,	has	given	rise	to	new	financial	practices	and	relations	through	the	centralization	of	profits,	and	novel	risks,	opportunities	and	pressures.	In	circulation,	ECEs’	integration	into	a	global	system	of	surplus	realization	and	the	need	to	boost	domestic	demand	through	exports	has	provided	impetus	for	the	increased	depth	and	sophistication	of	domestic	financial	markets	and	exerted	pressures	on	systems	 of	 social	 reproduction.	 In	 finance,	 the	 increased	 size	 and	 complexity	 of	 international	financial	 integration	has	drawn	ECE	agents,	 instruments,	and	markets	deeper	 into	the	remit	of	global	 financial	 markets.	 In	 all	 three	 spheres,	 these	 processes	 have	 been	 mediated	 by	 ECEs’	subordinate	 position	 in	 global	 production	 and	 finance,	 which	 has	 both	 contributed	 to	financialization	in	these	countries	(e.g.	through	the	heightened	volatility	of	domestic	asset	prices	and	 the	exchange	 rate)	and	given	 it	 its	 specific	 forms	 (e.g.	 the	 importance	of	 foreign	 currency	operations).			The	argument	has	an	important	corollary.	Not	only	has	financialization	been	mediated	by	ECEs’	global	subordination,	but	these	same	processes	of	financialization	may	serve	to	cement	or	even	deepen	their	subordination	in	the	global	hierarchy	of	nations.	Financialization	will	benefit	lead	firms	of	global	production	networks,	still	located	predominantly	in	ACEs,	which	are	able	to	channel	profits	into	financial	markets	and	deploy	financialized	strategies.	The	costs	of	engaging	in	GPNs	will	 be	 relatively	 higher	 for	 ECE	 firms.	 	 At	 the	 same	 time,	many	 of	 the	 ECE	 firms	which	 have	acquired	 global	 leadership	 and	 been	 able	 to	 profit	 from	 increasingly	 sophisticated	 financial	markets	have	been	from	traditionally	strong	sectors	such	as	mining	and	raw	materials	(at	least	in	the	case	of	Latin	America	and	Africa),	whereas	other	sectors	involving	high-risk	innovation	have	suffered	 from	 the	 increased	 volatility	 and	 risk	 brought	 by	 financialized	 capitalism.	 From	 the	perspective	 of	 circulation,	 insofar	 as	 financialization	 reinforces	 export	 orientation,	 this	makes	ECEs	more	vulnerable	 to	 the	volatility	of	 an	 ever	more	 finance-dominated	global	demand,	 the	relative	decline	of	which	has	 created	 several	problems	 for	ECEs	 in	 the	post-crisis	 era.	 	On	 the	financial	side,	financialization	has	helped	to	maintain	relatively	high	interest	rates,	and	exacerbate	external	 vulnerability	 and	 asset	 price	 volatility,	 rendering	 it	 yet	 more	 difficult	 to	 overcome	subordination	through	attracting	more	stable	long-term	investment	and/or	developing	domestic	financial	markets.			
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The	implications	of	both	cyclical	processes	of	financialization	and	secular	changes	associated	with	financialized	capitalism	across	the	uneven	hierarchy	of	global	capitalism	remain	underexplored.	More	research	is	needed	on	the	concrete	ways	in	which	the	uneven	nature	of	international	finance	and	production	are	both	shaped	by	and	exacerbate	changes	in	the	financial	relations	and	practices	of	global,	regional	and	national	economic	actors.					 	
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